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TWO MINUTE WARNING: THE TIME TO SETTLE THE
NFL FREE AGENCY DISPUTE IS NOW
The National Football League (NFL)' and the National Football League
Players Association (NFLPA)2 are battling over free agency, 3 in what may
be the longest labor dispute in this nation's history.4 The earliest form of
NFL restraint on player mobility was the reserve system, which included a
perpetual reserve clause in player contracts. s The clause permitted a team,
upon expiration of a player's contract, to renew the contract for another
year. 6 The new contract also included the reserve clause, giving a team the
right to renew player contracts in perpetuity. 7 The NFL replaced this system
with a "one year option" rule in 1947.8 The new rule restricted a team to
exercising the renewal option only once for each player. 9 This system allowed
a player to become an unrestricted free agent after playing out his option.'0
In 1962 the first player changed teams under the NFL's free agency
2
system," and the NFL reacted by unilaterally adopting the Rozelle Rule.'
The rule discouraged the signing of free agents by requiring the team

1. See ROBERT C. BERRY ET AL., LABOR
(tracing history of NFL's development).

RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS

89-92 (1986)

2. See LIONEL S. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS & THE LAW 275-92 (1977) (tracing history
of NFLPA from its founding in 1956 until 1975); PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, Tim SPORTS INDUSTRY

COLLEcTCVE BARGAINING 63-72 (1986) (discussing development and powers of NFLPA).
3. See Richard E. Bartok, Note, NFL FreeAgency Restrictions Under Antitrust Attack,
1991 DUK= L.J. 503, 503 n.1 (defining free agency as player's right to negotiate with and play
for other teams after his contract expires).
4. See Bob Oates, NFL Searches for the Magic Number, L.A. TImds, July 11, 1991,
Sports, at 2 (stating that five year quarrel between players and management over free agency
constitutes one of nation's longest contemporary labor disputes); Randall Samborn, fUnFree
Agency, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 30, 1991, at 1 (discussing history of NFL labor dispute and
suggesting it may be longest labor dispute in nation's history); cf. SOBEL, supra note 2, at
279-85 (describing 1974 player strike, which at time was longest in professional sports history).
5. See JAMas B. DwouN, OwNE s VERSUS PLAYERS: BASEBALL AND COLLECTIVE BAROAINING 249 (1981) (discussing NFL's use of reserve system to prevent player mobility); Edward
R. Garvey, From Chattel to Employee: The Athlete's Quest for Freedom and Dignity 445
ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 91, 92-97 (1979) (discussing development and elements
of reserve system); Bartok, supra note 3, at 508-09 (discussing use of reserve clause in NFL
player contracts).
6. See Bartok, supra note 3, at 508 (discussing renewal provisions of reserve rule).
7. Id.at 509.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting that R.C. Owens
signed with Baltimore Colts after playing out his option with San Francisco 49ers), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Bartok, supra note 3, at 509 (same).
12. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610 (discussing imposition of Rozelle Rule); Bartok, supra
note 3, at 509 (same).
AND
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acquiring a free agent to compensate the team losing the player. 3 It also
gave the NFL Commissioner power to award compensation if the two teams
could not agree on compensation. 4 Players challenged the Rozelle Rule in
Mackey v. NFL5 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that the restrictions violated the federal antitrust laws.' 6 Before
the United States Supreme Court could act on the NFL's petition for
certiorari the NFL and NFLPA agreed to a settlement, 7 which included
new free agency restrictions called the right of first refusal/compensation
system.' 8 These restrictions were incorporated into the 1977 and 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreements. 9
The 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement expired on August 31, 1987
and the parties have been unable to negotiate a new agreement.20 Consequently, the players have been working largely under the terms of the 1982

13. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610-11 (discussing compensation provisions of Rozelle Rule);
Bartok, supra note 3, at 509-10 (same).
14. See Bartok, supra note 3, at 509 (discussing NFL Commissioner's authority to award
free agency compensation under Rozelle Rule).
15. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); see infra notes
148-62 and accompanying text (discussing antitrust challenge to Rozelle Rule in Mackey v.
NFL).
16. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 622 (holding that Rozelle Rule violates Sherman Act § 1).
17. See Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,730, at 72,998 (D. Minn.
1977) (approving settlement in Mackey case), aff'd sub. nom. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280
(8th Cir. 1978).
18. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (discussing right of first refusal/
compensation system).
19. See infra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing right of first refusal/compensation provision in 1977 and 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreements).
20. See 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the National Football League
Players Association and the National Football League Management Council art. XXXVIII, §
2 (Dec. 11, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement] (designating expiration
date of agreement as August 31, 1987, or 60 days after either party gives written notice of
termination, whichever occurs later), reprinted in REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES AND
TEAMS 1983, at 11, 44 (PLI Pat. Copyrights Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook
Series No. 161, 1983) [hereinafter ATHLETES AND TEAMdS]. The 1982 Collective Bargaining
Agreement constitutes the complete understanding between the parties regarding terms and
conditions of player employment. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra, at art. II, § 1
(ATHLETES AND TEAMS, at 14). The agreement mandates that the NFL may not amend the
standard Player Contract without NFLPA approval. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra,
at art. XII, § 1 (ATHLETES AND TEAMS, at 26). It also regulates the administration of the
college draft. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra, at art. XIII, §§ 1-9 (ATHLETES AND

at 26-8). Furthermore, the agreement dictates restrictions on free agency under the
right of first refusal/compensation system. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra, at art.
XV, §§ 1-18 (ATHLETES AND TEAMS, at 28-33). The agreement also sets minimum salary levels
and regulates other compensation terms. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra, at art. XXII,
§§ 1-6 (ATHLETES AND TEAMS, at 40-42); see also Neil K. Roman, Illegal Procedure: The
National Football League Players Union's Improper Use of Antitrust Litigation for Purposes
of Collective Bargaining, 67 DENV. U. L. REV. 111, 120-21 (1990) (discussing expiration of
collective bargaining agreement and unsuccessful negotiations for new one); Gordon Forbes,
Owners Preparingto Offer "New Era" in Labor Relations, USA TODAY, Sept. 18, 1991, at
8C (noting expiration date of 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement).
TEAMS,
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Collective Bargaining Agreement. 21 In negotiating a new collective bargaining
agreement, the parties have argued about salary caps, 22 revenue sharing, 23
pension and medical benefits, 24 and free agency.25 Although the players have
decided to challenge the NFL's free agency restrictions in federal court, 26
the issues can and should be resolved through the negotiation of a new
agreement, not by resorting to litigation.
The most divisive issue during bargaining talks has been the question
of free agency. 27 Free agency allows a player, after a certain number of

21. See FootballFree Agency Limits Survive High Court Challenge, 205 N.Y. L.J. 5, 5
(1991) [hereinafter Limits Survive] (noting that NFL continues to enforce 1982 Collective
Bargaining Agreement even after its expiration).
22. See Paul Attner, Labor Pains, SoRinma NEWS, Dec. 30, 1991, at 16, 17 (stating
that NFL wants to limit team salaries to a set percentage [50-60%] of gross revenues, which
NFLPA opposes). The NFLPA opposes a salary cap, arguing that the NFL, unlike the NBA,
does not have the financial problems necessitating such salary limitations. Id. at 18; cf. Jeffrey
D. Schneider, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: The Lack of Free Agency in the NFL, 64 S. CAL.
L. R'v. 797, 839-42 (1991) (analyzing application of salary cap to professional basketball). A
salary cap is a maximum limit on team-wide salaries that does not limit individual salaries.
Id. at 839. The NBA guarantees players a set percentage of gross revenues, as weli as a
minimum salary if revenues are low, in return for accepting this salary ceiling. Id. at 839. But
see Will McDonough, Players Offer a Plan; NFL. Revenue Sharing Key Counterproposal,
BOsTON GLOBE, Feb. 15, 1992, at 31 (stating that players no longer oppose salary cap and
have included cap in their proposal to NFL).
23. See Owners OK Revenue Sharing, Cm. Tam., Sept. 14, 1991, Sports, at 6 (discussing
NFL proposal for revenue sharing). In order to distribute wealth fairly among teams, franchises
split network television income equally. Id. The teams have also proposed dividing income
from local radio and television contracts equally, as well as income from home game ticket
sales. Id.; see also Jack Brennan, In the Huddle, SPoRTINr NEws, Sept. 23, 1991, at 46 (noting
that teams in smaller cities will agree to free agency only if there is increased revenue sharing
with league); Extra Points, NEWSDAY, Sept. 14, 1991, at 100 (noting that NFL intends revenue
sharing to equalize incomes between small markets, like Green Bay, and larger markets, like
Los Angeles, so that all teams can competitively bid for players).
24. See Attner, supra note 22, at 18 (quoting players regarding importance to them of
improved benefits and noting NFL's proposal to cut player health and pension plans); see also
Peter King, The Players Speak, SPoRTS ILausTRATED, Nov. 4, 1991, at 58 (summarizing player
poll results which show that improved benefits are first priority for 56% of 205 players
surveyed, followed by free agency, receiving 39% of player votes).
25. See Attner, supra note 22, at 17-18 (stating that NFL has proposed two-tier free
agency system that would include salary cap, while players demand no salary cap and free
agency for all players at some point in their careers); see generally Schneider, supra note 22,
at 799 (discussing differences in free agency systems between professional football, basketball,
and baseball). Free agency is defined as freedom to choose and negotiate with other teams
for employment. Id.
26. See infra notes 81-96 and accompanying text (discussing player suit challenging free
agency restrictions under Plan B).
27. See Dennis A. Ahiburg & James B. Dworkin, Player Compensation in the National
Football League, in Tm BusiNss OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, 61, 61-63 (Paul D. Staudohar &
James A. Mangan eds., 1991) (noting that NFLPA made free agency major focus of 1987
negotiations); Ed Garvey, Foreword to The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional
Sports: A Perspective on Collective Bargaining in the NFL, 1989 DUKEa L.J. 328, 335-36
(discussing primacy of free agency issue in labor dispute and arguing that players should focus
on gaining fixed percentage of gross revenues instead); Oates, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that
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years, to negotiate with other teams for an employment contract. 2 The
1977 and 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreements contained a provision
known as the right of first refusal/compensation system, which restricted
player mobility. 29 That system applied to all veteran free agents ° and
permitted a player to accept an employment offer from another team after
his employment contract expired, but also gave the player's original team
the right to either match the new offer or to receive draft choices as
compensation from the new team. 31 The NFL modified this system on

free agency is biggest issue in current NFL labor dispute). But see BERRY, supra note 1, at
134 (noting that 1982 negotiations and strike did not focus on free agency issue).
28. See Schneider, supra note 22, at 798 (stating that free agency would allow players
to freely market their skills). Restrictions on free agency artificially repress player salaries and
maximize a team's bargaining power because other teams may not competitively bid for players.
Id. at 800-01, 809-10.
29. See 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 20, at art. XV (establishing
rules for player mobility). Section 10 of the article, in pertinent part, states that:
[I]n order for a veteran free agent's old club to be entitled to a right of first refusal,
the old club must have given a "qualifying offer" in writing to the NFLPA on or
before February 1.
Id. § 10 (ATHLETEs AND TEAMs, at 30). All player contracts expire on February 1, after which
time "any NFL club will be free to negotiate for a contract with a veteran free agent." Id. §
2 (ATHiEmS AND TEAMs, at 29). If a new team chooses to extend an offer to the free agent,
it must provide the old club with an Offer Sheet that contains the "principal terms" of the
offer. Id. § 3 (ATHLETEs AND TLEAms, at 29). Principle terms include the proposed salary figure,
any signing or reporting bonuses, and any modification of terms in the NFL Player Contract
form. Id. § 7 (ATHiEmrs AND TEAMS, at 29). Section four of the article, in pertinent part,
states that:
[I]f, within seven days from the date it receives an Offer Sheet, the veteran free
agent's old club gives to the NFLPA a First Refusal Exercise Notice ... such player
and his old club will be deemed to have entered into a binding agreement, which
will be promptly formalized in an NFL Player Contract(s); containing all the
"principle terms" of the NFL Player Contract(s) not modified by the "principal
terms."
Id. § 4 (AnTHaiEs AND TEAMs, at 29). If the old team does not match the terms of the Offer
Sheet then "the player and the new club will be deemed to have entered into a binding
agreement." Id. § 5 (ATmETEs AND TEAs, at 29); see also Ethan Lock, The Scope of the
Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 Durra L.J. 339, 346-47 (explaining functioning
of right of first refusal/compensation system and stating that high compensation costs completely deter player mobility); Roman, supra note 20, at 112 (describing how right of first
refusal/compensation system works and noting its importance in maintaining competitive
balance between teams).
30. See 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 20, at art. XV, § 1 (ATBL=
AND TEAMs, at 28-9) (defining veteran free agents as "players who play out the option in their
contracts or whose contracts otherwise expire.").
31. See id., § 12 (ATHLETES AND TEAMs, at 32-3) (enumerating provisions of complex
standardized compensation system based on player's professional experience and salary). For
the years 1982-84, compensation ranged from a third round college draft choice for a player
who had not completed three playing seasons and whose qualifying offer was between $80,000
and $95,00, to a team's first round draft choices for a player who had not completed his
third season and whose qualifying offer was greater than $250,000. Id. The system provided
for a $10,000 increase in the "qualifying offer" amount for each additional year of service.
Id. It also increased salary ranges for the years 1985-87. Id.
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February 1, 1989 and unilaterally implemented Plan B. 32 Plan B permits
each team to subject only thirty-seven of its approximately fifty-five players
to the right of first refusal/compensation system.13 The remaining players,
once their contracts expire, have two months to sign with other clubs
34
without their original teams having any rights of refusal or compensation.
The players assert that Plan B violates the federal antitrust laws by unlawfully restricting the movement of players between teams and depressing
player salaries. 5
The federal antitrust laws protect competition from combinations and
conspiracies that restrain trade 36 and from monopolization. 37 Congress drafted
the Sherman Act section 138 in very broad terms, and although the courts
could read the section as prohibiting almost every form of concerted activity,
they instead have consistently interpreted the statute as banning only un-

32. See Roman, supra note 20, at 122-23 (discussing NFL free agency proposals and
implementation of Plan B); Schneider, supra note 22, at 815-18 (same). The NFL offered the
players a choice between two free agency plans. Schneider, supra note 22, at 815. Plan A
would have reduced the compensation that a new team would have to pay to an old team.
Id. at 816. Plan B permitted limited free agency. Id. at 816. The NFLPA rejected both plans
and proposed a plan calling for a salary arbitration system and free agency for all players at
some point in their careers. Id. at 818 n.158. The NFL rejected that proposal and unilaterally
implemented a modified form of the proposed Plan B. Roman, supra note 20, at 122-23. The
plan allowed teams to protect 37 players, leaving the rest free to negotiate with other teams.
Id. at 123. In return for this increased mobility, Plan B eliminated player pension and severance
benefits. Schneider, supra note 22, at 816. The NFL claimed that Plan B benefitted players
because it permitted a large percentage of them to choose their employing teams. Roman,
supra note 20, at 123. Players, however, criticized the plan for not giving all players free
agency rights, and for punishing players by taking away benefits. Schneider, supra note 22,
at 818.; see also Martin Fox, Free Agency in Football Before High Court, 203 N.Y. L.J. 90,
90 (1990) (noting that disagreement over right of first refusal/compensation system led to 1987
player strike, after which NFL unilaterally imposed Plan B).
33. See Roman, supra note 20, at 112 (estimating average NFL team size at 55 players);
see also Bartok, supra note 3, at 513 & n.53 (noting that NFL regulations permit 47 active
players on roster, but teams are also permitted to have additional injured players under
contract).
34. See Samborn, supra note 4, at 1 (noting Plan B's two month free agency provision);
see also Roman, supra note 20, at 123 (discussing increased player mobility in 1989 under
Plan B); Peter King, Inside the NFL, SPORTS ILUSTRATED, Sept. 18, 1989, at 68 (noting that
229 free agents changed teams between February 1, 1989 and April 1, 1989). One hundred
and forty-nine of the players who changed teams were under contract at the beginning of the
1989-90 season. Roman, supra note 20, at 123.
35. See Poweli v. NFL, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1359 (D. Minn 1991) (challenging legality
of Plan B as applied to 1990-91 playing season and alleging injuries resulting from restrictions
on movement).
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (prohibiting combinations in restraint of trade). Sherman
Act § 1, in pertinent part, states that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... is declared to be illegal." Id.
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) (prohibiting monopolization and attempted monopolization).
Sherman Act § 2, in pertinent part, states that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part or the trade or commerce ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Id.
38. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (defining Sherman Act § I protections).
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reasonable restraints of trade.3 9 Courts primarily apply the statute to prohibit
product market concentration, but also use it to protect against group
against
boycotts 4° and employment market concentration. 4' The prohibition
42
unreasonable restraint applies to professional football as well.
Players generally bring antitrust suits under Sherman Act section 1,
alleging that the NFL rules unreasonably restrain player movement between
teams and prevent players from earning competitive market salaries.43 The

39. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1982) (stating
that Sherman Act § 1 prohibits only unreasonable restraints on trade because Congress did
not intend to prevent all restraints); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 687-88 (1978) (stating that courts have broadly interpreted Sherman Act in order
to incorporate common law focus on analyzing effect of restraint on competition); Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918) (holding that courts analyze
antitrust cases by determining whether restraint promotes or destroys competition); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1911) (stating that courts must consider public
policy arguments in evaluating alleged anticompetitive restraints on trade); see also Lock, supra
note 29, at 343-44 (discussing application of antitrust laws to challenged restraints of trade).
40. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 364 (1963) (holding that collective
action resulting in concerted effort not to deal constitutes group boycott and violates Sherman
Act § 1); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (holding that
group boycott is illegal even if its effects make little difference to general economy).
41. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1177-82 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing
application of federal antitrust laws to NFL player draft and finding that draft rules do not
constitute a group boycott).
42. See Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (holding that NFL is subject to federal
antitrust laws). But see Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a
Single Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare
Model, 82 MIcH. L. Rav. 1, 37-43 (1983) (arguing that NFL is single economic entity that
cannot conspire with itself, so its rules regulating free agency do not violate antitrust laws);
Gary R. Roberts, ProfessionalSports and the Antitrust Laws [hereinafter Roberts, Professional
Sports], in THE Busn~zss OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, 135, 135-48 (Paul D. Staudohar & James
A. Mangan eds., 1991) (analogizing NFL rules to partnership and corporate decisions that are
not subject to antitrust conspiracy challenges); Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the
Sherman Act: the Use and Abuse of Section 1 to Regulate Restraints on IntraleagueRivalry,
32 UCLA L. Rav. 219, 260-62 (1984) [hereinafter Roberts, Sports Leagues] (arguing that
sports leagues are different from other forms of business organizations and courts generally
should treat leagues as single business entities). Professor Roberts bases his theory on the fact
that the NFL cannot produce its product (a football game and ultimately the Superbowl)
without the cooperation of all the other teams. Roberts, ProfessionalLeagues, supra, at 14344. Thus, individual teams are not competitors and the Sherman Act has no role in regulating
internal league management practices (such as NFP imposed players restraints). Roberts, Sports
Leagues, supra, at 260-62.
43. See Radovich, 352 U.S. at 445 (holding that plaintiff's allegations that restrictions
in NFL player contract prohibiting him from signing with other clubs constitutes valid cause
of action under Sherman Act § 1); Smith, 593 F.2d at 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that
1968 NFL draft unreasonably restrained trade in violation of Sherman Act § 1); Mackey v.
NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 622 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that "Rozelle" rule unreasonably restrained
trade and player movement), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp.
73, 82 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (holding that NFL draft and reserve rules imposed by NFL before
parties reached collective bargaining agreement violate Sherman Act), vacated in part, 1975-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,543 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 907 (1979).
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National Football League Management Council (NFLMC), which is the
collective bargaining arm of the NFL, argues that such limitations on player
mobility are necessary to prevent the richer teams in larger markets, or
more popular winning teams, from acquiring a disproportionate number of

the best players and creating a competitive imbalance44between teams that
would destroy competition and the league as a whole.
The NFL's principle defense to the players' antitrust allegations is that

its restrictions are immune from federal antitrust laws under a nonstatutory
labor exemption that permits the NFLPA to bargain away antitrust rights
during collective bargaining agreement negotiations in exchange for conces-

sions from the NFLMC. 45 The nonstatutory labor exemption is a common

law creation that protects those labor market restraints that a collective
bargaining agreement incorporates to further labor policy principles. 46 The

United States' labor policy grants employees the right to form unions and

to negotiate collectively with management regarding working conditions. 47
However, by banding together to make collective demands upon an employer, as well as to strike or boycott an employer, unions restrain commercial activity and competition because they limit an employer's ability to
negotiate with employees individually and impede an employer's marketing

of products. 41 Consequently, concerted union activity would constitute a
Sherman Act violation, creating a conflict between federal antitrust and

44. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 621 (discussing NFL's arguments for needing player
restraints); Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 745-46 (D.D.C. 1976) (discussing NFL's
argument that it cannot maintain competitive balance between teams without restrictive player
draft), rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
45. See Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403 (D.D.C. 1986) (noting that NFL
moved for summary judgment based on nonstatutory labor exemption defense in suit challenging player draft); Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-17 (rejecting NFL's nonstatutory labor defense
to Rozelle Rule challenge); see also Lock, supra note 29, at 351-53 (discussing history of
nonstatutory labor exemption); Note, Releasing Superstarsfrom Peonage: Union Consent and
the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption, 104 HARv. L. Rav. 874, 875-79 (1991) (discussing development of nonstatutory labor exemption and principles behind it).
46. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing development of nonstatutory
labor exemption).
47. See National Labor Relations Act §§ 1-19, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988) (establishing
labor regulations to overcome imbalance of bargaining power between employers and employees). Section one of the National Labor Relations Act, in pertinent part, states that:
It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
48. See Lock, supra note 29, at 351 (noting that unions are combinations that potentially
impede commercial activity); see also Note, supra note 45, at 876-77 (characterizing unions as
"labor-selling cartels" that fix wages and eliminate labor market competition).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:601

labor policies. 49 Congress addressed this clash of labor and antitrust policies
by creating a statutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws in the Clayton
Act ° and the Norris-LaGuardia Act," exempting certain union organizing,
bargaining, and negotiating activities from antitrust liability.12 These statutes
do not, however, protect the terms of a collective bargaining agreement
53
from antitrust attack.
The nonstatutory labor exemption prevents the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement from violating the antitrust laws. 4 However, the
exemption covers only those provisions that affect the immediate employment relationship, namely wages and other mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining." A problem with application of the nonstatutory labor exemp49. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), aff'd 235 U.S. 522 (1915) (holding that
prior to passage of Clayton Act in 1914, labor union activities potentially gave rise to cause
of action under Sherman Act § 1).
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988) (stating that labor unions are not combinations in restraint
of trade). Section six of the Clayton Act states that:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation
of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purpose of
mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or
restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the
legitimate objectives thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof,
be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade,
under the antitrust laws.
Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1988) (limiting court's power to enjoin specific union organizational
activities).
51. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, 113 (1988) (expanding protection of union activities
against judicial injunctions).
52. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 62122 (1975) (discussing union activities protected from antitrust attack under federal labor
statutes); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 501-03 (1940) (holding that employee
strikes do not violate federal antitrust laws); see also Note, supra note 45, at 877 (stating that
nonstatutory labor exemption covers such activities as making coordinated proposals to
employers and striking).
53. See Lock, supra note 29, at 351-52 (distinguishing protection of union activity from
antitrust protection of agreements between labor and management); Note, supra note 45, at
877-78 (same).
54. See Connell Constr. 421 U.S. at 621-22 (holding that labor policy requires that
collectively bargained for conditions be immune from antitrust challenges); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965) (holding that nonstatutory labor exemption
protects agreements between employers and unions from liability under Sherman Act); United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 666-67 (1965) (holding that union may reach
agreement with multi-employer bargaining unit, but may not agree with employers to impose
uniform labor standards on other bargaining units); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S.
219, 234 (1941) (holding that union acting in own self-interest is immunized from liability
under federal antitrust laws).
55. See United Mine Workers, 381 U.S. at 658 (holding that nonstatutory labor exemption
covers only those agreements affecting parties to suit); see also Lock, supra note 29, at 35152 (noting that terms are only protected if primarily affect employment matters and do not
affect outside parties); Note, supra note 45, at 877 (stating that exemption applies primarily
to wages and working conditions, and not to provisions affecting competition in employer's
product market).
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tion is that it is not clear whether the exemption applies only to labor
market restraints that are part of a mutually-agreed-upon collective bargaining agreement, or whether the exemption also applies to those restraints
that an employer unilaterally imposes or maintains once collective bargaining
has failed to produce an agreement. 6 This has been the central legal issue
for debate between the NFL and the NFLPA since the NFL unilaterally
implemented Plan B and claimed protection from antitrust liability under
the nonstatutory labor exemption.5 7 Exemption beyond the expiration of
the collective bargaining agreement would give the NFL little incentive to
make any new concessions." Alternatively, simultaneous expiration of the
exemption with the collective bargaining agreement immediately subjects the
NFL to potential antitrust liability. 59 The latter situation would empower
the players' union, particularly near the end of a collective bargaining
agreement 0 Even after many years and lawsuits the debate has not been
resolved.
In 1987, nine football players and the NFLPA initiated Powell v. NFL
(Powell 1)61 against the NFL and its member organizations after the players
union had been unable to reach a collective bargaining agreement with the
NFLMC.6 2 The players alleged that the restrictions on veteran free agency
under the right of first refusal/compensation system and the NFL Player
Contract 63 violated the Sherman Act by depressing player salaries and

56. See Lock, supra note 29, at 352 (noting that Supreme Court decisions do not provide
clear guidelines for determining when nonstatutory labor exemption ends); Note, supra note
45, at 878 (noting that courts have not resolved question of whether union consent is necessary
for exemption to apply after expiration of agreement).
57. See Ethan Lock, Powell v. National Football League: The Eighth Circuit Sacks the
NationalFootballLeague Players Association, 67 DENy. U. L. REv. 135, 138-39 (1990) (noting
importance of nonstatutory labor exemption defense in NFL labor dispute litigation).
58. See Lock, supra note 29, at 372 (arguing that extension of terms of collective
bargaining agreement beyond its expiration allows stronger parties to benefit from status quo
and to hold-out during negotiations).
59. See Roman, supra note 20, at 131 (noting that employers would become liable for
treble damages at moment contract expires if nonstatutory labor exemption terminates at that
point). Mr. Roman argues that periodic threats of judicial review of collective bargaining
agreement terms constitutes government interference that violates freedom of contract principles. Id. at 129. But see Note, supra note 45, at 891-94 (arguing that time for termination of
nonstatutory labor exemption is at expiration of contract). Subjecting employers to antitrust
liability immediately upon expiration of a collective bargaining agreement encourages collective
bargaining because parties clearly know when risk begins. Id. at 892.
60. See Roman, supra note 20, at 130-34 (arguing that threatened antitrust litigation
upon expiration of collective bargaining agreement is improper weapon for unions under federal
labor policy).
61. 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988); see Roman, supra note 20, at 111 (noting that
players initiated lawsuit on same day they ended their 24 day strike).
62. See Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 781 (D. Minn. 1988) (noting that players filed
suit in October, 1987 after negotiations with NFLMC proved unproductive).
63. See 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 20, at art. XII app. M
(ATm.
AND TAms, at 26, 63-67) (stating that all players must sign standard NFL player
contract). The NFL Player Contract is a one-year agreement that incorporates, and is superseded
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restricting movement between teams. 4 The United States District Court for
the District of Minnesota held that the restrictions on free agency, which
had been part of the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, were immune
from antitrust attack until the two parties had reached a bargaining impasse 65
over the issue. 6 A year later, the players' union returned to the district
court (Powell II) alleging that the parties had reached an impasse on the
free agency issue. The union also sought a preliminary injunction against
the owners that would prohibit them from continuing to enforce the right
of first refusal/compensation system that limited the ability of veteran free

agents to negotiate and sign contracts with other teams. 67 The court acknowledged that the parties had reached a bargaining impasse and that the

players probably would prevail on their antitrust claims. 68 However, the
court also noted that granting the injunctive relief would create unrestricted
free agency until the court could resolve the dispute on its merits. 69 Consequently, the strong federal policy that favors collective bargaining and

prevented the court from
opposes judicial interference in labor 7negotiations
0
granting the players injunctive relief.

On interlocutory appeal (Powell IV), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court's ruling and held that the
nonstatutory labor exemption from federal antitrust laws extends beyond
by, provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at cl. 1 (ATHLETES AND TEAMs, at
63). Standard provisions in the collective bargaining agreement cover severance pay, Collective
Bargaining Agreement, supra note'20, at art. XXIV (AnTLETS AND TEAMS, at 42-43), retirement
plans, Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 20, at art. XXXIV (A m AND TEAM,
at 48-50), minimum compensation, Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 20, at art.
XXII, § 1(ATnaEms AND TEAms, at 40), and health insurance, Collective Bargaining Agreement,
supra note 20, at art. XXXIII (ATESETas AND TEams, at 47-48). The right of first refusal/
compensation system, as a provision within the collective bargaining agreement, is also
incorporated into the NFL Player Contract. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 20,
at art. XV (ATLETEs AND TEAMs, at 28-33) ; see also Leigh W. Steinberg, Negotiating
Contracts in the National Football League, in LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AN AmATEURi SPORTS
§§ 6.01-.05, (Gary A. Uberstine ed., 1988) (describing standard and negotiable items within
one-year Standard NFL Player Contracts).
64. See Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 778-79 (stating player allegations).
65. See Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967) (enumerating factors
considered in determining whether parties have reached an impasse, including good faith of
parties, importance of issue, and length of negotiations), aff'd sub nom. American Fed'n of
Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (1968). Generally, impasse is a stalemate
in negotiations where both parties have bargained in good faith and exhausted all prospects
of reaching an agreement. Id.; see also Charles D. Bonnano Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454
U.S. 404, 412 (1982) (noting that impasse is temporary deadlock and is recurring feature in
bargaining process).
66. See Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 789 (holding that nonstatutory labor exemption protects
restraints until parties have reached an impasse).
67. See Powell v. NFL, 690 F. Supp. 812, 813 (D. Minn. 1988) (stating player allegation
that parties have reached an impasse).
68. See id. at 818 (stating that players are likely to prevail in suit, and some may suffer
irrevocable harm).
69. Id. at 814.
70. Id. at 816; see also Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) (stating general
policy against granting injunctive relief in labor disputes).
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the expiration of an agreement, and even beyond a bargaining impasse.7 1
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that as long as an ongoing collective bargaining
relationship exists between the parties and an "array of remedies" is
available to the plaintiffs under federal labor laws, the nonstatutory labor
exemption would continue to protect the NFL from antitrust attack.72 The
Eighth Circuit failed, however, to define at what point a nonstatutory labor
exemption expires.7 3 By leaving this issue open for debate, the court permitted an employer to continue to impose conditions on its employees
without gaining union consent, thus making the crucial question of deciding
if the exemption applies hinge on whether a union exists, not on whether
the employer is negotiating with the union.74 Judge Heaney dissented from
the majority opinion, arguing that the decision was inconsistent with labor
principles and that it left the players with a choice of either being bound
forever by the player -restraints in the last agreement or abandoning the
75
players association's collective bargaining rights.

71. Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 711 (1991).
In an additional arm of the Powell litigation, Powell III, the plaintiffs challenged the college
draft under federal antitrust laws, but that case is not pertinent to this discussion. Powell v.
NFL, 711 F. Supp. 959 (D. Minn. 1989).
72. See Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1300 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied lII S. Ct. 711
(1991) (noting examples of alternative remedies available to union, such as player strikes and
unfair labor practice claims filed with NLRB charging NFL with refusing to negotiate in good
faith). The players went on strike in 1987 but the strike ended without a new contract. Id. at
1296; see also Ahlburg & Dworkin, supra note 27, at 61-63 (noting that NFLPA has called
two player strikes during 1980's alone); Limits Survive, supra note 21, at 5 (mentioning 1987
player strike). But see STAUDOHAR, supra note 2, at 68-69 (discussing general player aversion
to strikes). Professor Staudohar argues that player aversion to strikes results from psychological
attachment to the sport and the authoritarian structure of football. Id. at 68-69.
73. See Powell, 930 F.2d at 1303 (stating that "[u]pon the facts currently presented by
this case, we are not compelled to look into the future and pick a termination point for the
labor exemption.").
74. See Note, supra note 45, at 875 (noting that existence of union becomes crucial
question in determining whether nonstatutory labor exemption applies to restraints unilaterally
imposed by management after collective bargaining agreement has expired and parties have
reached bargaining impasse). The Note argues that the nonstatutory labor exemption should
end when the collective bargaining agreement expires. Id. at 886. This would create a brightline rule and prevent the uncertainty involved in determining when an impasse has been
reached, and when, beyond that point, the nonstatutory labor exemption expires. Id. at 88892. The rule would also encourage collective bargaining because employers would know when
they might become liable for antitrust treble damages and would seek to reach an agreement
before that time. Id. at 892.
75. See Powell, 930 F.2d at 1304-07 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's failure
to define when nonstatutory labor exemption expires). Judge Heaney argues that the majority's
decision is not consistent with the labor laws, and that the nonstatutory labor exemption ends
when the parties reach an impasse. Id. at 1304-05. The exemption protects restrictions resulting
from good faith bargaining, and bargaining requires union participation and approval. Id. at
1305. However, in this situation the NFL is unilaterally continuing to impose restrictions
against the union's will. Id. This leaves the players the option of either striking or decertifying
and terminating their collective bargaining rights. Id. at 1306. In Judge Heaney's opinion, the
courts should not force employees to choose between these options when their employer may
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When the players' union asked the United States Supreme Court to

grant certiorari, nine state attorneys general filed a brief as amici curiae in
support of the players. 76 The attorneys general criticized the Eighth Circuit
for overextending the reach of the nonstatutory labor exemption from
antitrust laws and warned that the implications of the Powell IV holding
might go beyond the professional football context and apply in principle to

other industries in which unions have negotiated toward or reached collective
bargaining agreements with multi-employer groups. 77 The concern is that
once employees agree to anticompetitive and potentially unlawful restraints
they may be prohibited indefinitely from challenging the restraints, thereby

undercutting employees' negotiating power. 78 The Supreme Court, however,
denied certiorari, and tacitly upheld the decision that NFL rules that limit
79
player movement between teams are exempt from federal antitrust laws.

The Eighth Circuit decision in Powell IV left the parties unclear as to

when the nonstatutory labor exemption would expire.80 Arguing that the

Powell IV decision gave players the option of either abandoning their union
representation or indefinitely working under the NFL's player restraints,
eight individual players, in McNeil v. NFL,8s have brought a suit under
Sherman Act section 1 against the NFL and its member clubs.8 2 The players
allege that the NFL's unilaterally imposed Plan B restrictions created illegal

player restraints during the 1990-91 football season s3 and that the teams
had conspired to prevent the players from selling their services in a free
market. The players also allege that their union had abandoned its collective
be violating the antitrust laws. Id. Furthermore, extending the nonstatutory labor exemption
beyond impasse discourages collective bargaining because restraints may be enforced indefinitely. Id. at 1306.; see also Lock, supra note 57, at 151-53 (arguing that nonstatutory labor
exemption requires union consent to apply beyond expiration of contract).
76. See Fox, supra note 32, at 1 (discussing reactions to petition for certiorari). The
amici curiae brief, submitted by New York Attorney General Robert Abrams, was filed on
behalf of Arizona, Hawaii, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, New York, Texas, Utah and
Wyoming. Id.
77. Id. In addition to several attorneys general, the Department of Justice also advocated
a greater limitation on the antitrust exemption, fearing that the Eighth Circuit's holding would
have a broad, negative impact on all collective bargaining, particularly in the sports and
entertainment industries. Id.
78. See Note, supra note 45, at 891 (noting that permitting nonstatutory labor exemption
to apply beyond expiration of agreement would create "irrevocable consent" and would require
employees to decertify their union in order to challenge restraints). This also would inhibit
collective bargaining because unions would refuse to agree to restraints that they could not
rescind or challenge in the future. Id. The "beyond impasse" standard also violates the tenet
of freedom to contract that permits parties to choose the length of their agreement. Id.
79. See Powell v. NFL, 111 S. Ct. 711, 711 (1991) (denying certiorari).
80. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (discussing Eighth Circuit's failure to
define when nonstatutory labor exemption expires).
81. 764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991).
82. Powell v. NFL, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1353-54 (D. Minn. 1991). Although the McNeil
suit is separate from the Powell litigation, the NFL sought consolidation of the actions,
resulting in the opinion being published under the name Powell v. NFL. Id.
83. Id. at 1354.
84. Id.
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bargaining rights, and the players moved for a partial summary judgment
on the issue of whether the nonstatutory labor exemption defense was
available to the NFL. 85 The NFL subsequently moved to consolidate the
case with the Powell litigation, the ongoing class action suit in which the
plaintiffs allege similar antitrust violations.8 6 Thus, in Powell V, the district
court faced two issues: Whether the nonstatutory labor exemption was
available to the NFL as a defense and whether the district court should
consolidate the Powell and McNeil suits.8 '
In Powell V the district court held that the nonstatutory labor exemption
was not a defense available to the NFL because no collective bargaining
relationship existed between the NFL and the players union during the 199091 playing season. 88 The district court also refused to consolidate the two
suits because the McNeil plaintiffs' claim was narrower than the claim in
Powell V.19 The McNeil plaintiffs seek damages for alleged injuries caused
by imposition of Plan B during, the 1990-91 playing season alone. 90 The
Powell litigation, on the other hand, challenged player restraints dating
from 1987 and included other issues not present in McNeil.91The court also
found that the NFLPA no longer has an ongoing collective bargaining
relationship with the NFL, noting that the NFLPA has refused to bargain
with the NFL since November 6, 1989; has ceased regulating agents; and
has abandoned its grievance arbitration role. 92 Thus, the debate in Powell
V regarding whether a collective bargaining relationship exists between the
parties is not an issue in the McNeil case. 93 Consequently, the district court
granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment striking the
NFL's nonstatutory labor exemption defense to the plaintiffs' antitrust
suit.9 4 Furthermore, in denying the NFL's motion to consolidate McNeil
with the Powell litigation, the court noted that the Powell plaintiffs had
filed a motion to decertify the class and dismiss their suit. 9 In Powell VI
96
the district court dismissed these claims.
Judicial recognition of the NFLPA's decertification as a bargaining
agent for the players was critical to the McNeil plaintiffs' defeat of the
NFL's nonstatutory labor exemption defense. 97 Decertification means that

85. Id.
86. Id. at 1359.
87. Id.at 1353.
88. Id. at 1359.
89. Id.
90. See id. (noting that plaintiffs challenged restraints during the 1990-91 playing season
under Sherman Act § 1).
91. See id. (noting that Powell litigation includes allegation of Sherman Act § 2 violations
and challenges to standard NFL Player Contract as illegal restraint).
92. Id. at 1358.
93. Id.at 1359.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 773 F. Supp. 1250 (D. Minn. 1991).
97. See Powell v. NFL, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1359 (D. Minn. 1991) (stating that decerti-
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the NFLPA no longer will serve as a collective bargaining agent for the
players and that no bargaining relationship exists between the NFLPA and
the NFL. 9 A majority of the players-nearly sixty-two percent-voted to
end collective bargaining, and the union reorganized as a voluntary professional association.99 The organization's new by-laws prohibit the players
association or its individual members from collectively bargaining with the
NFL, its teams, or agents.'0 The NFL argued that the decertification was
ineffective because the union had not formally decertified with the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and because the association still acts as a
labor union. 01 The NFL also alleged that the decertification was a "sham"
intended to force the NFL into negotiations. 0 2 Alternatively, the NFL argued
that the labor exemption continues regardless of the players association's
union status, despite the fact that the NFL earlier had conceded that the
exemption would end if a certified union ceased to represent the players. 03

The Powell V district court stated that the NFL's arguments had no
basis in law."3 4 The court held that the existence of a bargaining relationship
depends on whether a majority of the affected employees support the union,

not on whether the NLRB has certified the union. 05 Likewise, the NLRA
does not require an NLRB decertification proceeding to end a collective
bargaining relationship.3 6 The court found additional support for its decerfication destroyed any collective bargaining relationship between parties, thus ending nonstatutory labor exemption).
98. Id.; see also Laurent Belsie, You Think Baseball is Tangled in Dispute, CHRisnTAN
ScI. MONITOR, Mar. 12, 1990, at 7 (noting that NFLPA refuses to advance grievances or
collectively bargain on behalf of players). But cf. Ahlburg & James, supra note 27, at 69
(noting that former Miami Dolphin Larry Csonka is attempting to form new union called
United Players of the National Football League).
99. See Powell, 764 F. Supp. at 1354 (noting substantial support among players for
ending union's collective bargaining relationship with NFL). The court noted that "[o]ver 930
of the approximately 1,500 players who were in the NFL at that time (November 1989) signed
petitions which stated that neither the NFLPA nor any other entity was authorized to act as
their representative in collective bargaining." Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1356-57.
102. Id.at 1354.
103. Id.at 1358.
104. Id. at 1357.
105. Id.; see Howard Lesnick, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB
Election, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 851, 861-62 (1967) (discussing fact that certification is only one
method of accomplishing representative status). In cases where an employer commits unfair
labor practices during union organizing campaign and withholds recognition of a union to
undermine its majority support, the courts may impose a bargaining order on the employer.
Id. at 858.
106. See Powell v. NFL, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1358 (D. Minn. 1991) (stating that courts
do not require decertification procedures to end collective bargaining relationship when union
has lost its majority support); see also NLRB v. Florida Citrus Canners Coop., 288 F.2d 630,
639 (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that NLRA does not require employer to bargain with union or
petition to decertify union when it has lost majority support), rev'd on other grounds, 369
U.S. 404 (1962); NLRB v. Superior Fireproof Door & Sash Co., 289 F.2d 713, 719 (2d Cir.
1961) (holding that labor law does not require union decertification in order to end employer's
duty to bargain with union).
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tification finding in four aspects of the new organization's activities. 07 First,
the union had filed a labor organization termination notice with the Department of Labor.108 Second, the union had changed its tax-exempt status
classification from a labor organization to a business league.'09 Third, the
union had notified the NFL that it would no longer represent the players
in grievance proceedings and notified the players that they must pursue any
claims against the NFL or its members on an individual basis through their
own legal counsel." 0 Fourth, the NFLPA no longer regulated agents, and
the association had not engaged in collective bargaining on behalf of the
players since November 6, 1989.111 The court held that the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) guarantees employees the right to refrain from selforganization and collective bargaining," 2 and the court granted the players'
motion for summary judgment on the unavailability of the NFL's nonstatutory labor defense."' Consequently, the "array of remedies" that the
Eighth Circuit earlier had found were4 available to the players association
in Powell were no longer applicable."

The Powell V decision is important because it signals the availability of
antitrust suits and threatened antitrust suits as bargaining tools for players
to use in negotiations with the NFLMC, and could clear the way for veteran
free agency." 5 As a result, several other players have filed antitrust lawsuits
against their teams and the NFL." 6 Additionally, the decision forced the

107. Powell, 764 F. Supp. at 1354.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. But see Aaron Bernstein, The NFL Decides its Finally Time to Punt, Bus. WK.,
Oct. 7, 1991, at 40 (noting NFL 's criticism of NFLPA's continued directing and funding of
player lawsuits); Bob Oates, NFL Trading CardBusiness Isn't Child's Play, L.A. Thms, June
18, 1991, at 4 (discussing NFLPA's role as licensing agent representing players with football
card companies in order to earn income to pay court costs for player suits); Oates, supra note
4, at 2 (quoting NFLPA executive director Gene Upshaw as saying "[tihe (NFLPA's) role
isn't to bargain with the owners but to pay for the players' litigation.").
111. Powell, 764 F. Supp. at 1354.
112. Id. at 1358. Section seven of the National Labor Relations Act states that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
113. Powell, 764 F. Supp. at 1360.
114. See id. at 1359 (noting that NFLPA may no longer institute unfair labor practice
proceedings against NFL with NLRB, collectively bargain, or call strike).
115. See Attner, supra note 22, at 17-18 (discussing NFLPA's increased bargaining strength
resulting from potential NFL antitrust liability).
116. See Byrd Accuses Chargers in Antitrust Suit, L.A. TwMs, Aug. 13, 1991, Sports, at
2 (discussing Marcus Allen's suit against Raiders). Marcus Allen's contract expired in 1988
and the Raiders have refused to either trade him or substantially increase his salary, but
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NFL owners to negotiate seriously with the players for the first time in
nearly five years." 7 Settlement discussions raise the questions of whom the
NFL can negotiate with now that the players union has decertified and
what will be the long term effects of union decertification?"'8
By decertifying, the players association has refused to serve as a collective bargaining agent for the football players." ' 9 Consequently, each player,
most likely through an agent, will have to negotiate an individual contract
with the team employing him. 20 This situation will serve the interests of
agents, who will now have the opportunity to negotiate everything from
postseason pay to pensions instead of just the regular season pay that they
previously negotiated.' 2' It may also benefit superstars, who are in a strong
individual bargaining position.1'2 However, decertification most likely will

instead make him play under the terms of his expired contract. Id. Allen, a running back, has
filed an antitrust suit against the Raiders, and has been joined by San Diego Charger cornerback
Gill Byrd. Id. The players allege that they cannot seek their fair market value because team
owners prohibit them from negotiating with other teams. Id. The lawsuit names only the
Raiders and the Chargers as defendants, but blames their predicament on the NFL rules. Id.
The complaint alleges that players "can never receive a competitive market value for their
services and are denied the freedom of movement available to the employees in any other
industry in the United States." Id. The players also allege that the NFL has imposed a boycott
against players seeking higher salaries and engaged in price fixing. Id.; Chris Dufresne, Allen
Accepts Fate, Grudgingly Reports, L.A. Tnmas, July 14, 1991, Sports, at 1 (same). Allen's
suit also alleges that NFL hasn't negotiated in good faith since 1985. Id. A free agent since
1990, Allen has received no offers from other teams because of his high compensation price,
which is two first-round draft picks. Id.; see also Antitrust Suit Filed for NFL Players, L.A.
Twmis, Oct. 18, 1991, Sports, at 3 (discussing class action filed by Albert Lewis and Wayne
Radlof challenging NFL's imposition of Plan B restrictions in 1989).
117. See Will MeDonough, NFL Offers to Share Revenue, BosToN GLOBE, Oct. 22, 1991,
at 77 (describing NFL collective bargaining agreement proposal). The NFL proposal calls for
a limited free agency plan determined by a player's salary and number of playing years. Id.
The proposed plan would allow some players to become free agents after three years (depending
on their salary), and others after six years if they are not yet making $1 million. Id. The
proposal also calls for a salary cap set at 56% of gross income. Id. It also offers a paid
performance system (a wage scale) for compensating rookies and revenue sharing. Id.; Manny
Topoi, NFL Considers Radical Labor Plan, NEwsDAY, Nov. 6, 1991, at 147 (describing NFL
proposal as including $28 to $30 million dollar per team salary cap).
118. See Bill Saporitio, The Owner's New Game is Managing, FoRTuNE, July 1, 1991, at
86 (asking with whom NFL can negotiate). But see Bernstein, supra note 110, at 40 (noting
that NFL must negotiate with NFLPA's lawyers because any negotiation by NFLPA executive
director with NFL would constitute collective bargaining, which is prohibited by union's
decertification status).
119. Powell v. NFL, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (D. Minn. 1991).
120. See Schneider, supra note 22, at 846-48 (discussing fact that without collective
bargaining agreement all players would negotiate contracts individually, which disproportionately benefits "star" players).
121. See Garvey, supra note 27, at 329-30 (discussing role of agents in NFL player contract
negotiations).
122. See Schneider, supra note 22, at 847-48 (discussing strong negotiating leverage of
"star" players); cf. Chris Mortensen, Lynn's Sin Was Refusal to Cut Ties to Vikings, SPORTING
N-ws, Aug. 12, 1991, at 38 (discussing quarterback Dan Marino's five year, $20 million dollar
contract with Miami Dolphins, which possibly resulted from threat of free agency in NFL);
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work to the detriment of a vast majority of the players, particularly linemen
and other nonsuperstar players who have minimal individual bargaining
power. T I These players make up approximately ninety-six percent of the
players in professional football,' u and these nonsuperstar players are the
parties most likely to suffer from decertification because they are not able
to negotiate individually for such benefits as adequate pensions, severance
pay, an effective grievance system, or even medical insurance.ITI The fact
that fewer than five percent of all professional players are able to negotiate
demonstrates the weak barinjury or skill guarantees into their contracts
26
gaining position of most individual players.
One of the detrimental effects that decertification already has had on
the players is that the NFL unilaterally has altered the structure of player
benefits packages and increased the playing season without notifying the
players association. 2 7 Benefits packages are particularly important to the
average football player, who has a professional playing career of fewer than
four years.IT 8 Because of the short careers of players, NFL team owners
have little incentive to take care of nonstar, disposable players. 29
On the other hand, decertification has given the players a much-needed
economic weapon. 30 Decertification has voided the NFL's nonstatutory
Chris Mortensen, Millen Brings Leadership, Spunk to Skins, SPORTING NEWS, Aug. 19, 1991,
at 43 (speculating that running back Barry Sanders' four year, $12.5 million contract, which
included $10,000 bonuses for each offensive lineman if Sanders rushes for more than 1,000
yards, resulted from Detroit Lions' fear of impending free agency).
123. See Schneider, supra note 22, at 847-48 (noting that linemen and linebackers are
relatively interchangeable, thus making them principle beneficiaries of collectively bargained
for benefits). Mr. Schneider describes the vast majority of NFL players as "fungible" because
their individual performances will not likely make a team win, or increase its profits. Id. at
833. Teams can often replace these players with others without significantly affecting the
teams' performance. Id. at 834. Consequently, their salaries are relatively low because of the
weak demand for their services. Id. at 847. Collective bargaining agreement provisions that
mandate such terms as grievance procedures and pension and health plans are very important
to these fungible players who may not be in a position to bargain for these benefits on their
own. Id. at 848. Mr. Schneider argues that the NFLPA, by decertifying and refusing to
collectively bargain, is doing the players as a whole a disservice. Id.
124. See Garvey, supra note 27, at 338 (noting large percentage of players who would
benefit more from collective bargaining agreement than from free agency).
125. See id. at 355-58 (discussing weak bargaining power of players).
126. See Lock, supra note 29, at 355 (discussing inability of players to successfully bargain
with NFL).
127. See Powell v. NFL, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1359 & n.8 (D. Minn. 1991) (noting NFL's
unilateral changes in employment terms and stating that such actions would constitute unfair
labor practice if valid union were in existence).
128. See Lock, supra note 29, at 355 n.92 (estimating average player's professional career
at less than four years); Steven A. Riess, A Special Profile of the ProfessionalFootballPlayer,
1920-82, in THE Busumns oF PRor SioNAL SPoRTs, 222, 239 (Paul D. Staudohar & James A.
Mangan eds., 1991) (discussing short average playing life of professional football players).
Professor Riess notes that in 1986 the NFLPA estimated an average player's tenure at 3.2
years and the NFL estimated it at 4.5 years. Riess, supra, at 239.
129. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text (discussing relatively easy replacability
of most players).
130. See Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1307 (8th Cir. 1989) (Heaney, J., dissenting)
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labor exemption and permitted players to challenge restraints on free agency
under federal antitrust laws.' The possibility of a successful antitrust suit
raises the prospect of treble damage awards for players who have been
restricted from signing contracts with other football teams.3 2 Additionally,
a judicial ruling that the Plan B reserve system violates federal antitrust
law would establish a right to veteran free agency.' The players have been
unsuccessful in previous attempts to bargain for veteran free agency because
the NFL team owners have refused to discuss any such proposals. 3 4 In an
attempt to force a concession on the issue, the NFLPA called a player
strike in 1987 that only served to demonstrate the union's weakness. 35 The
strike began in the third week of regular season play, but the owners quickly
countered by scheduling televised games with replacement players. 3 6 Within
two weeks, striking players began returning to the field, and after three
"scab games" and twenty-four days the players voted to end the strike. 37

(noting that threat of antitrust liability serves as "antitrust lever" giving players greater
bargaining power in negotiations with NFL), cert. denied, I11 S. Ct. 711 (1991); Attner, supra
note 22, at 17 (noting that players have "ultimate leverage" because they do not have to reach
settlement before going to trial).
131. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text (discussing unavailability of nonstatutory labor exemption in McNeil suit).
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) (permitting treble damages to injured party in antitrust
suit). Section fifteen, in pertinent part, states that:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue . '. . without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost
of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id.; see also infra note 144 and accompanying text (estimating potential NFL liability at
between $800 million and $1 billion).
133. See Garvey, supra note 27, at 329 (stating that plaintiff victory in McNeil suit could
result in veteran free agency).
134. See Attner, supra note 22, at 16 (stating that NFL's refusal to even consider NFLPA
free agency proposals led to 1987 player strike). Dallas Cowboys president Tex Schramm was
quoted as telling the union "[n]o free agency, not this year, not in five years, not in 10 years,
not in 20." Id. But see Tim Kawakami, A New World Coming, L.A. TEmss, Aug. 29, 1991,
Sports, at 1 (discussing inevitability of free agency). Tex Schramm is quoted in 1991 as saying
"[y]es, I'd have to say I think there probably will be free agency at some time. Hey, the
world's changing. Some things, you have to live with in a different way." Id.
135. See Attner, supra note 22, at 18 (describing 1987 strike as "disaster" that undermined
union's power); see also supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing player litigation
following unsuccessful strike).
136. See Lock, supra note 29, at 367 (noting that owners cancelled only one week of play
before substituting replacement players for striking players); Michael Janofsky, Sparse Crowds,
Heavy Picketing at NFL Games, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 5, 1987, at Al (describing lower fan
attendance and incidents of violence at replacement games, but noting that fans generally
accepted replacement team games).
137. See Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 781 (D. Minn. 1988) (noting that player strike
lasted from September 22, 1987 until October 15, 1987); Lock, supra note 29, at 367 (stating
that players began crossing picket lines after two weeks and voted to end strike after 24 days);
Michael Janofsky, No Bargaining Accord-Antitrust Suit Filed Against Club Owners, N.Y.
Tnas, Oct. 16, 1987, at 1 (discussing end of strike and simultaneous filing of lawsuit by
players).
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The attempt to force* the owners to accept free agency backfired and
demonstrated management's strong position relative to the players' union. 3
Because the strike did not accomplish the union's free agency goals,
the players initiated the Powell litigation, which helped define the issues
and arguments that the McNeil plaintiffs raise in their pending antitrust
suit. 3 9 Powell V accomplished judicial recognition of the fact that the
nonstatutory labor exemption does not immunize the NFL from antitrust
allegations brought by players for injuries sustained after the union decertified in November 1989.Y ° Without the labor exemption, the NFL potentially is liable for treble damages for unreasonably restraining trade in
violation of the Sherman Act section 1."4 The antitrust claim is a significant
a court may find that Plan B illegally limits player mobility
weapon because
42
and salaries.
NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue has stated that while he is confident
that Plan B will withstand judicial scrutiny, he believes that the parties
would serve their best interests by reaching a settlement and having the
players withdraw their antitrust suit. 43 Commissioner Tagliabue's statement
suggests that the NFL management is concerned about the prospect of
losing the McNeil suit and about the possibility that the NFL will lose its
opportunity to reach an agreement on player mobility. The worst scenario
for the NFL would be to fail to reach an agreement with the players before
the antitrust issue goes to trial and to have the court determine that Plan
free
B violates federal antitrust laws. This could result in both unrestricted
44
agency and treble damages estimated to be as high as $1 billion.'
However, the players are not guaranteed a victory in the courts. Courts
hold challenged restraints on trade, such as Plan B, to either a per se
analysis or rule of reason analysis, 45 and the McNeil court will most likely
138. See Attner, supra note 22, at 16 (noting that NFL "crushed" players' strike).
139. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing start of Powell litigation).
140. See supra notes 88-94, 104-14 and accompanying text (discussing Powell V decision
and NFL's loss of nonstatutory labor exemption on Nov. 6, 1989).
141. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing treble damage liability for
violating Sherman Act); see also Powell v. NFL, 773 F. Supp. 1250, 1254-55 (D. Minn. 1991)
(holding that players other than Powell plaintiffs may challenge implementation of Plan B
during the 1989-90 playing season). The parties in Powell expressly agreed to amend the earlier
class certification order to exclude any claims for damages resulting from implementation of
Plan B during the 1989-90 playing season. Powell, 773 F. Supp. at 1254.
142. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing notion of antitrust suit as
economic weapon for players to use in negotiations).
143. See Tagliabue Defends NFL Free Agency, UPI, Aug. 27, 1991, availablein LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File (noting Commissioner Tagliabue's desire to reach equitable agreement
with players). Commissioner Tagliabue also stated that the present system treats veteran players
unfairly when compared to Plan B free agents and rookies. Id.
144. See Attner, supra note 22, at 17 (discussing risks involved for NFL in not reaching
settlement with players and estimating liability as high as $1 billion); Samborn, supra note 4,
at 1 (stating that NFLPA conservatively estimates NFL treble damage liability at $800 million
if court holds that Plan B restrictions violate Sherman Act).
145. See LAWRENCE A. SuLuvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrRUST 165-86 (1977)
(tracing development of per se and rule of reason doctrines).
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hold Plan B up to the rule of reason analysis. 146 Courts apply the per se
rule to agreements that are so obviously unreasonable and void of redeeming
competitive value that the court does not even have to inquire into the
purported justifications for the agreement in order to deem it illegal. 47 In
Mackey v. NFL 48 the Eighth Circuit found that the district court had
misapplied the per se standard in its antitrust analysis of the Rozelle Rule,

49

which allowed the NFL Commissioner to set compensation in free agent
transfers. 50 The Mackey court found that the unique nature of professional
sports makes inquiry into the justification for restraints appropriate' and
applied the rule of reason analysis. 52 Only restraints on trade that serve
legitimate business purposes and are no more restrictive than necessary will
3
satisfy the rule of reason standard.1
In evaluating the Rozelle Rule, the Mackey court weighed management's

arguments in favor of the restraint on free agency against the players'

146. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (describing rule of reason analysis as
requiring court to consider competitive effect of restraint and public policy arguments in
determining whether restraint is unreasonable); see also Lock, supra note 29, at 344-46 (stating
factors court considers in evaluating reasonableness of restraint). The court looks at the
purpose and effect of the restraint, as well as the availability of less restrictive alternatives.
Id. at 344. Courts apply rule of reason analysis to industries, such as professional sports,
where they lack expertise. Id.
147. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 357 (1967) (holding that agreement
between competitors not to compete is per se illegal); Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457, 472 (1941) (holding that group boycott constitutes per se violation of Sherman
Act); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 618 (8th Cir. 1976) (discussing, but refusing to apply,
per se rule to NFL player restraints), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); see also supra note
40 and accompanying text (discussing prohibition against group boycotts); Worthen Bank &
Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 124-30 (8th Cir. 1973) (discussing
application of per se rule to group boycott and price restraint cases), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
918 (1974); Julian 0. von Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine-An Emerging Philosophy of
Antitrust Law, 11 UCLA L. REv. 569, 569-78 (1964) (discussing development of per se rule).
148. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
149. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text (discussing development of Rozelle
Rule).
150. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that per se analysis
is inappropriate in unique business situations), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). The
Mackey court also gave a brief history of the Rozelle Rule. Id. at 610-11. The Rozelle Rule
was an amendment to. the NFL's Constitution & Bylaws that allowed the commissioner to set
the compensation due to a losing team when an acquiring team signed a free agent. Id.
151. Id. at 619; see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984) (applying
rule of reason analysis to college basketball broadcasting regulations because sports business
is unique and courts have minimal knowledge of area); Thane N. Rosenbaum, The Antitrust
Implications of Professional Sports Leagues Revisited: Emerging Trends in the Modern Era,
41 U. Mman L. Rav. 729, 740 (1987) (stating that rule of reason is predominant test for
Sherman Act section 1 challenges to player restraints).
152. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 623 (holding that Rozelle Rule violates rule of reason
analysis).
153. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (defining factors
used in rule of reason analysis, including less restrictive alternatives); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (establishing rule of reason analysis).
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arguments opposing it. 54 The court enumerated management's reasons for
restraining player mobility, including maintaining a competitive balance
between teams, protecting team investments in scouting and player development costs, and protecting team stability and quality of play.1 51 In
contrast, the players argued that the rule decreased their bargaining power
in contract negotiations, depressed their salaries, and restricted their ability
to sell their services. 5 6 The Eighth Circuit recognized that the NFL has a
strong and unique interest in maintaining a competitive balance among its
teams,'157 but the court found that the Rozelle Rule was more restrictive
than necessary because it applied to all players regardless of ability, was
5
unlimited in duration, and was unaccompanied by procedural safeguards. 1
Although these findings led to the determination that the Rozelle Rule
violated the Sherman Act section 1, the court emphasized that its holding
did not prohibit every restraint on player services as necessarily violative of
the antitrust laws. 5 9 Some reasonable player mobility restrictions may be
necessary for the successful operation of the NFL.' 60 The court strongly
encouraged the two sides to resolve their dispute through collective bargaining, but the court did not foreclose the possibility that it would uphold,
as lawful under the federal antitrust statutes, a unilaterally imposed restric6
tion on free agency.' '
After the player victory in Mackey, the two sides executed the 1977
Collective Bargaining Agreement, which included the right of first refusal/
compensation system. 62 The 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement included
63
the same reserve system as the 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The right of first refusal/compensation system and the Plan B system that
the NFL unilaterally implemented on February 1, 1989, are the modified
free agency systems that the players have challenged.'"
In McNeil, the district court will most likely apply the same rule of
reason analysis to the Plan B challenge that the United States Court of

154. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620-21.
155. Id. at 621.
156. Id. at 620.
157. Id. at 621.; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing NFL argument
that player restraints are necessary to maintain competitive balance).
158. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 622.
159. Id. at 623.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the National Football League
Players Association and the National Football League Management Council art. XV (Mar. 1,
1977) (setting out terms of right of first refusal/compensation system), in REPRESENTiNG
AND LEAGUES, 17, 60-69 (PLI Pat. Copyrights
PROFESSIONAL AND Cou.EOE SPORTs TW
Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 84, 1977); see also supra notes
29-31 and accompanying text (describing right of first refusal/ compensation system).
163. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (describing right of first refusal/
compensation system).
164. See Lock, supra note 29, at 346 (discussing free agency restrictions and player
challenges to them).
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Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied to the Rozelle Rule in Mackey. 65
Because the Mackey court acknowledged the legitimate interest that the

NFL has in limiting player mobility, the analysis will involve a weighing of
the players' interests against management's interests.'6 It is not clear what

the outcome of the suit will be, but commentators generally anticipate a
6
player victory. 6 7 Both parties stand to either lose or gain a great deal.
As Commissioner Tagliabue suggested, the preferred solution would be for70
the parties to negotiate a solution to avoid litigation.

69

Federal labor policy

also strongly advocates settlement of labor disputes over mandatory subjects
of collective bargaining.' 7' The NFLPA, however, cannot represent the

165. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text (discussing application of rule of
reason analysis to Rozelle Rule).
166. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text (noting arguments for and against
free agency restrictions).
167. See Attner, supra note 22, at 17 (stating that legal experts believe that NFL has "an
excellent chance of losing"); Kawakami, supra note 134, at 1 (discussing inevitability of free
agency in professional football); Oates, supra note 4, at 2 (noting NFLPA's winning streak in
courtroom). But see Bartok, supra note 3, at 559 (arguing that right of first refusal/
compensation system is procompetitive and reasonable under rule of reason analysis). Mr.
Bartok argues that the court's analysis should consider the effects the restrictions have on
competition in the labor market (players), product market (NFL games as form of entertainment), and consumer market (fans). Id. at 518. The author uses complex regression analysis
to determine that the compensation system (requiring the team signing a free agent to
compensate the losing team) is procompetitive because it benefits consumers and the NFL
product while only slightly injuring players. Id. at 556-57. The analysis also concludes, however,
that the system does not enhance intraleague competition, contradicting one of the NFL's
strongest arguments. Id. at 557. Furthermore, the right of first refusal has only marginal
effects on competition, and without the compensation system it would be unreasonable. Id.
at 558. Taken together, however, Mr. Bartok concludes that the right of first refusal/
compensation system is pro-competitive and legal. Id.
168. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing potential treble damage liability
of NFL and prospect of unrestricted free agency); Attner, supra note 22, at 16 (quoting
NFLPA executive director Gene Upshaw as saying that "[i]f the players don't get free agency
now, they never will get it. It's our last chance because of our leverage.").
169. See Tagliabue Answers NFL Questions, USA TODAY, Aug. 20, 1991, at 8C (noting
Commissioner Tagliabue's belief that litigation is not appropriate method of settling labor
dispute); see also supra note 143 and accompanying text (noting Commissioner Tagliabue's
desire to settle labor dispute without litigation).
170. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1973) (defining employer's failure to bargain with employees' union as an unfair labor practice); 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1973) (defining union as
exclusive representative of employees for purposes of collective bargaining over mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1991) (stating that "such obligation [to
bargain] does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession."); see also NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1958) (noting obligation of parties to bargain in good faith over mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining, but also emphasizing that parties are not obligated to reach agreement);
Roman, supra note 20, at 128-30 (discussing labor policies that advocate collective bargaining
and oppose governmental intervention in labor disputes).
171. See 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (1991) (creating obligation, which is applicable to both
employer and union, to bargain collectively over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment.").
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players because it has abandoned its role as a bargaining representative of
the players. 7 2 Furthermore, the question arises as to what would constitute
a fair and equitable solution to the parties' conflicting interests. The principle
73
issue that the parties will have to decide will be the free agency question.
The key areas of debate over free agency involve questions of which
players are eligible, when players will become eligible, whether the team
losing a player will retain a right of first refusal, and whether the acquiring
team should have to compensate the losing team for signing a player. 7 4
One commentator, Professor Brody, has proposed a solution that would
make all players free agents after four years, eliminate the right of first
17
refusal, and implement a "same" round draft choice compensation system.
While the proposal might satisfy both management and the players, there
is another solution that is more practical because it incorporates elements
of proposals already made by each party. This solution includes a four-

year free agency eligibility requirement, a salary cap, a compensation system

based on money compensation, and possibly a limited right of first refusal.
On the issue of eligibility, Professor Brody suggests that the NFL permit
all veteran players who are not under contract and who have played in the
76
NFL for at least four years to freely negotiate with other NFL teams.
The four-year time period takes into consideration the short playing life of
most players 77 as well as a team's interest in receiving the benefit of training
players and accurately determining their value to the team. 7 1 Although the
players originally demanded total free agency, their February 1992 settlement
proposal reportedly offered restrictions on mobility during a player's first
four-to-six years of league play. 179 Unlike the players, who propose making
all players eligible for free agency, 80 the NFL has proposed a two-tiered,
three- and six-year plan that ties free agency eligibility to salary levels. 8 '

172. See supra notes 97-100, 107-11 and accompanying text (discussing union decertification).
173. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing primary importance of free
agency issue in NFL labor dispute).
174. See Burton F. Brody, NFL Free Agency: A Modest Proposal,67 DENV. U. L. REv.
155, 159 (1990) (listing major areas of debate regarding free agency).
175. See id. at 159-64 (discussing terms of free agency system proposal).
176. See id. at 159-60 (proposing eligibility for all players after four years). Professor
Brody reasons that because four years is the average length of the a player's career, anyone
who played beyond that time is above-average and should benefit from free agency. Id.
177. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (citing estimates of length of average
professional playing career).
178. See Brody, supra note 174, at 160 (stating that teams invest in players by teaching
them skill and that free agency restraints give teams opportunity to recoup those investments
on playing field). Within four years a team should be able to fairly judge a player's ability
and determine how much it would be willing to pay to retain him. Id.
179. See McDonough, supra note 22, at 31 (discussing player proposal that includes
provision for free agency after four-to-six years of play).
180. Id.
181. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (stating that NFL free agency proposal
is limited to those players who have not received contract offer of at least $1 million after six
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Despite the differences between the two proposals, they demonstrate that
both the players and management view four years as a reasonable waiting
period before a player becomes eligible for free agency. The players are
very forceful in their demands for free agency for all players at some point
in their careers, so a collective bargaining agreement will likely include such
18 2
a provision.
Another issue for negotiation between the parties is the right of first
refusal system that currently permits a team to match another team's offer
and retain a player.'83 Professor Brody proposes elimination of the right
and suggests instead that the NFL should permit a player's original team
to bid for a former player who becomes a free agent.1'4 Elimination of the
right of first refusal would allow a player to accept an offer from a different
team even if the new offer was inferior to that made by his original team,
or would allow the player to return to his original team with a salary
determined by the market. 5
While eliminating the right of first refusal protects a player's freedom
of choice, it does not adequately consider a team's legitimate interests in
retaining players. 8 6 Furthermore, such unrestricted player mobility could
arguably lead to players migrating to attractive geographic climates or to
winning teams, and could adversely affect the competitive balance that the
league tries to maintain.8 7 The parties could resolve their conflicting goals
by agreeing to a right of first refusal system that requires teams to do more
than just match another team's offer. The new system could require that a
team desiring to retain a free agent offer him a larger compensation package
than the team seeking to acquire the player, perhaps 110% of any qualifying
offer. If the original team failed to make such a counter-offer within a
specified period of time, the player would be free to sign with the new
team. This proposal would compensate the player for the restrictions placed
on his mobility and allow the team to retain a desirable player. The players,
however, may not be willing to agree to such a restriction on their mobility,

years of professional play). This $I million maximum salary provision of the proposal suggests
that the teams have a strong interest in protecting those players earning in excess of that
amount and are trying to deny them free agency eligibility. Id.
182. See Attner, supra note 22, at 17 (discussing union insistence on free agency for all
players).
183. See Brody, supra note 174, at 160-61 (discussing right of first refusal system and
proposing that parties eliminate it from future collective bargaining agreements).
184. Id.
185. See id. (arguing that eliminating right of first refusal would make player's salary
reflect his true value to team). Professor Brody also argues that eliminating right of first
refusal will encourage teams to treat their players better if the teams hope to retain them. Id.
186. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 621-22 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
801 (1977) (recognizing NFL's interest in restricting player mobility to protect league's competitive balance); see also supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing team's reasons
for seeking to retain players).
187. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 621 (listing NFL's arguments for imposing player restraints).
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particularly if they anticipate winning unlimited free agency from the McNeil
l
suit. 8

An alternative solution would be to eliminate the right of first refusal
while instituting a team-wide salary cap. 18 9 Like limits on free agency, the
players were initially opposed to the idea of a salary cap. 19 A salary cap
would limit the amount of money that teams could spend on salaries, but
would also require teams to spend a minimum percentage of gross revenues
on salaries and benefits. 91 Although players originally opposed any restrictions on salary expenditures, they included the salary cap in their proposal
to the NFL in order to ameliorate management's concerns about excessive
salaries, particularly rookie and free agent salaries. 92 The NFL's previous
proposal included a salary cap and "paid-performance" system that would
have created a wage scale for rookies and free agents. 193 The players are
vehemently opposed to any sort of wage scale and hope to reach a com194
promise with management by agreeing to a salary cap.
A salary cap would benefit the NFL because it would limit each team's
expenditures on salaries, guaranteeing that the league's competitive balance
would not be destroyed by an owner "buying" a winning team. Because
teams already share revenues, 95 they would all be spending approximately
the same amount of money on salaries. The players would also benefit
because they would be guaranteed a fixed percentage of revenues. Furthermore, player mobility most likely would increase because teams would be
less likely to spend part of their finite salary "pot" on players whom they
could not play, thus making teams less willing to retain those players.
Although a salary cap does limit the amount of money a team can spend
on salaries, the benefits associated with a cap far outweigh the harm.
A final issue that the parties would have to resolve in order to reach
an agreement is whether a team signing a free agent would have to

188. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (noting that conventional wisdom is that
players will win McNeil suit if parties go to trial).
189. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing NFL proposal that includes
salary cap).
190. See Attner, supra note 22, at 17 (discussing player opposition to salary caps);
McDonough, supra note 22, at 31 (noting change in player attitude from opposing salary cap
to proposing one).
191. See Attner, supra note 22, at 17 (discussing NFL salary cap proposal that offers to
pay players between 55-60% of designated gross revenues); McDonough, supra note 22, at 31
(discussing player proposal requesting 58-600oo of revenues, depending on how parties decide
to define "revenues").
192. See Attner, supra note 22, at 17 (noting NFL's concern with escalating salary and
bonus levels, particularly for rookies).
193. See id. (discussing proposal to base rookie salaries on playing time, player performance, and team performance).
194. See McDonough, supra note 22, at 31 (discussing strong player opposition to any
form of wage scale).
195. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing revenue sharing among NFL
teams).
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compensate the team losing the player. 96 The current system uses draft
choices as compensation and ties the draft choice round to the free agent's
salary offer and years of experience. 197 Professor Brody proposes a "same
round" draft compensation system. 9 The system would require a team
signing a player to compensate the team losing the player with the same
round draft choice in the next draft that the original team used to acquire
the player in an earlier college draft. 199 If the draft choice were lower in
the round than the choice used by the losing team to originally acquire the
player, then the signing team also would have to give up its draft choice
in the next round. 200 Professor Brody argues that under his system the
market for free agents would be more active than it is now because a
player's compensation level would not rise with his salary level. 20 ' A problem
with his proposal, however, is that it places too much emphasis on when a
player was drafted, and not enough on his professional performance. A
college star who was drafted in the first round, yet plays mediocre professional ball, will demand first round draft choice compensation even if no
team is willing to consider paying it and even if his salary is low because
his own team does not value his services very highly. That player would
not have a chance of being signed as a free agent under Professor Brody's
system. Furthermore, the NFL draft expires in 1993, leaving the fate of the
system in doubt, so it may not be the best base on which to build a
compensation system.2 02
As an alternative solution, the parties should consider creating a system
that requires a signing team to pay a losing team a certain percentage of
the free agent's new salary for the next year. In addition, the acquiring

196. See Brody, supra note 174, at 161-63 (discussing compensation issue and proposing
"same round" draft choice compensation system).
197. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing compensation determination
under right of first refusal/compensation system).
198. See Brody, supra note 174, at 161-63 (discussing "same round" draft choice compensation system proposal).

199. Id.
200. Id. at 162. Arguably, this system would prevent teams from signing a large number
of high draft choice players because they would not have a sufficient number of draft choices
to compensate the losing team. Id. The proposal also would give losing teams a bidding
advantage because they would have higher draft choices within each round. Id. The proposed
system would replace salary levels with acquisition costs as the criterion for compensation and
would create a special subsystem for players who had been playing in the NFL for six or
more years. Id. Because those players probably would be less valuable than a younger player,
the system would either use a sliding scale or flat rate level of compensation. Id. This system
would adjust the required draft choice compensation downward for every year that the player
has played. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Bob Oates, NFL Extends Draft Through 1993, L.A. Tims, Mar. 17, 1992,
Sports, at 2 (noting expiration of college football draft in 1993 and suggesting that college
players will challenge NFL's unilateral decision to extend draft beyond 1993); see also
McDonough, supra note 22, at 31 (stating that player proposal calls for reducing number of
rounds in college draft from twelve to six after 1993).
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team would also have to pay the losing team a set dollar figure that would
be scaled to the free agent's years of experience and position. The agreement
would dictate the fixed figure and would take into .consideration training
expenses and other costs of developing or acquiring players for a particular
position. The figure would need to be large enough to fairly compensate a
team for losing a player, yet small enough not to discourage the active
bidding on and signing of free agents. The losing team then could use this
compensation money to acquire additional players or to increase the salaries
of players it most desires to retain. The agreement should exempt this
compensation money from the losing team's salary cap limit, thus giving
teams losing a player the advantage of having additional money to use for
obtaining or retaining other players.
This proposal also would eliminate the mandatory use of draft choices
as compensation. However, the agreement should give teams the option of
agreeing to substitute a draft choice for any part of the compensation
money that the acquiring team would owe the losing team under this system.
The parties would need to agree to use draft choices as compensation
because the agreement would not permit teams to unilaterally substitute
draft choices for money compensation, nor would it mandate the use of
draft choices as compensation. Taken together with a modified form of
first refusal or a salary cap, this compensation system should satisfy the
players and management and resolve the current labor dispute. The system
would fairly compensate teams for losing a free agent without setting
compensation levels so high as to discourage the signing of free agents.
Furthermore, the salary cap guarantees players a fixed percentage of revenues while also appeasing management's concerns with ever-increasing salary
levels. By establishing a four-year eligibility requirement, teams would have
sufficient time to train and test their players on the field, yet all players
also would be free to leave after four years.
The debate between the NFL and its players over the issue of free
agency has been raging for years. 2 3 Although the players have attempted
to negotiate for less restrictive player restraints on mobility, bargaining has
resulted in few concessions from management.04 Decertification and the
threat of antitrust damages, as well as the possibility that courts will find
Plan B illegal, have empowered the players. 2 5 Although decertification
arguably was necessary to defeat the NFL's nonstatutory labor exemption
defense to.the federal antitrust laws, remaining nonunionized will not help
most individual players. 206 The players need to band together again and

203. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (suggesting that NFL labor dispute may be
longest in nation's history).
204. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing history of NFL's unwillingness

to bargain over free agency issue).
205. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text (discussing NFL's loss of nonstatutory
labor exemption defense to player antitrust suits).
206. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text (discussing weak individual bargaining
power of vast majority of players).
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collectively negotiate with the more receptive NFL to resolve the free agency
issues that have persisted for decades.2
Walter J. Godlewski III

207. See supra notes 174-203 and accompanying text (proposing possible solution to labor
dispute).

